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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of:
BABY GIRL ~~RIE, a person under
eighteen years of ase,

Case No. 14599

NADINE MUNOZ,
Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

APPEAL FRO:.! JUDGMENT OF THE FIRST
DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT, IVEBER COUNTY,
THE HONORABLE CHARLES E. BRADFORD,
PRESIDING

PETITION FOR REHEARING

The Respondent, State of Utah, by and through
the Utah Division of Family Services, respectfully petitions
this court for rehearing in the above entitled cause and
alegcs thut the court in its majority opinion erred on the
following points:
POINT I:

IT WAS IMPROPER FOR A SUCCESSOR
JUDGE I~HO DID NOT HEAR ORAL ARGU-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~1ENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
DECISION OF THE INSTANT
CASE.

POINT II:

'I"HE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSIONS AS TO ALLEGATIONS
AND CONDITIONS SUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT A 'l'ERI-liNATION
DECREE.

POINT III:

THE COURT IN VACATING THE
ORDER OF TERMINATION,
FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
LEGAL EFFECT OF INTERVENING ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS
OR TO GIVE LEGAL DEFERENCE TO THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD.

WHEREFORE, Respondent prays that this action
be reheard by this Honorable Court, that such rehearing
be scheduled for an early setting and that the foregoing errors of the court be corrected in the interest
of law and justice.
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
FP.ANKLY!\ R. HATHESO:l
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-2Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
IT WAS I~WROPER FOR A SUCCESSOR
JUDGE WHO DID NOT HEAR ORAL ARGUMENT
TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DECISION OF THE
INSTANT CASE.
The instant case was heard on oral argument before
the Supreme Court on November 11, 1976.

Oral argument was

granted on Motion of Petitioner, good cause appearing therefore.

The Honorable F. Henri Henriod, Chief Justice, and

the following duly elected or appointed Judges heard the
oral argument:

Justice A. H. Ellett, Justice J. Allan Crockett,

Justice Richard J. Maughan and Justice D. Frank Wilkins.

On

or about December 31, 1976, before the decision of the court
was filed, Chief Justice Henriod retired from the Bench.

On

January 3, 1977, Justice Gordon R. Hall, was appointed by the
Governor to fill the vacancy on the court.
case was filed February 24, 1977.

Decision in this

Justice Hall had not heard

or participated in the oral argument.

Justice Maughan wrote

the majority opinion, joined by Justices Wilkins and Hall.
Both

Justices Ellett and Crockett dissented and wrote dis-

senting opinions.

The vote of Justice Hall, who was not

a member of the court at the time the matter was heard or
a participant therein, was in effect, the deciding vote.
Without his vote the matter would have been deadlocked two
to two and the cause of the Petitioner denied.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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We believe that participation by Judge Hall in
the decision of this appeal was improper and that for this
reason a rehearing should be granted.
To our knowledge there is no provision in our State
Constitution, statutes or rules of practice in regard the
powers of successor appellate judges.

It is also acknowledged

that most of the reported authority as to the powers of successor judges deals with trial judges.

(See 22 A.L.R.

3d 922)

The exact question of whether or not a successor judge of
our Supreme Court is precluded from participating in the
decision of a matter heard on oral argument by his predecessor is, we believe, a question of first instance.

However,

by analogy to related cases and on the basis of fair play,
we feel there is persuasive reason to find that it was improper for Judge Hall to participate in the decision of the
instant case.
In the case of Cordner v. Cordner, 91 U. 474, 64 p. 2c
828 (1937), the question was raised as to whether or not a

su~

cessor judge who did not participate in the original decision
could participate in the question of a petition for rehearing.

In a per curiam decision this court said no,

holding that the new member of the court should not particrpate in the consideration of a petition for rehearing.
original decision was rendered on a 3-2 vote.

The

Though thP

Cordner case deals with participation of a successor judge
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after the original decision was legally rendered, we think
the reasoning of the court in that case is significant and
perhaps determinative of our present situation.

The Court

stated:
The effect of the participation
of a new member of the court, where
the court is evenly divided on the
question after t~e retirement of the
former member, would establish a
precedent frough~ with dangerous implications. (64P.2d 828).
This reasoning is on all fours with our position
in the instant case.

After the retirement of Justice Henriod,

who participated in the hearing of
evenly divided.

our case, the court was

To allow Justice Hall, a new member of the

court, to participate in the decision and in effect cast
the deciding vote "establishes a precedent fraught with
dangerous implications."

Certainly this was the effect as to

the respondent.
The Cordner case goes on to say:
it would be mischievous in a
high degree to permit the re-opening of
controversies every time a new judge takes
his place in the court .
(64 P.2d 829).
\ve submit that to permit Judge Hall

to participate

in the decision, after the oral argument which was apparently
felt to be of utmost inportance to the Petitioner, was
mischievous.
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The Cordner case cites a previous Utah case in In
Re Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 17,

269 P.

(1927), \·:hich

103

in turn had cited with approval a Montana case of Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, 63 Mont.
(1922).

376, 207 P.

993,

24 A.L.R.

294

In the Montana case a district judge substituted

for an incapacitated supreme court justice.

A 3-2 decision
~ith

was rendered by the court, the district judge voting
the majority.

The incapacitated judge subseque'-tly died and

was replaced.

Even so, on the petition for rehearing, the

new justice was excluded from participating and the district
judge who participated in the original

decisio~

other members of the court to hear the petition
In the case of Woodbury v. Dorran, 15 Minn.

sat with the
~or

341,

re~earing.

like~ise

cited with approval in the Thoreson case, supra, a

~i~~esota

Court held it would be "a violation of pro!='rietys ir. tr.e adr.tinistration of justice" to allm-: a successor j·..:dge ·,.·:-.o did
not participate in the original hearinc to
question of a petition for

re~eari:-.g.

is improper for a justice \,·ho did not

part~ci~ate

in

t~e

l:e s·..:t:-:-it t:-.2.-: if it
partic~~ate

i:-. tr.e

original hearing to participate i'- t~e pet~t~c~ for re~ear~'-5•
it is equally ir.1proper, nay r.ore sc, fer
participate in the original

~caring

to

2

j·..:stic':' ·.·:-.o

part:c~;~te

d~c

'- t:-e

original decision.

ir..portar.cc on the or2.2. arc;-..:.~e::~ .s~a:;c c~ :~.~ ___ ~~.:..~~-

In rel:;uttal ,..e respc·:~;:; as .:c2 2c. ·":
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-~·

Petitio~er classified his

ceeding of the highest degree"
to

whic~

we agree.

(1963).

a~~

the

la~

the

~ritten

in

(Brief of Appellant, pg. 5)

See also Jones v. Moore, et al., 6, Utah

(1923); ~elson ''· Pierce, 14 U 2d 317, 383

383, 213 P. 191
P.2d 925

appeal as "an equity pro-

This court was free to review both the facts

arri~ing

decision

at its decision.

t~at

fl..:en:::e8 bi' state:-.ents of

It is obvious from

tte najority opinion was greatly inallege~

fact by Petitio:1er's Counsel

i:1 :-.is trief and at the ti:-:-e of oral arg·.l.cent.
i:-. re::3.r:i to

t~e

~.:er:r·

c:-itical

q...:.es~i:,::

a~~are:-:':.2.·:
.

..

c;:

For exa1:1ple,

lac!"\es

c~

-.-.

.::..

,

the part

chose to belie7e assertions

recc.::-d.

..-;:.

0:1

(Decisior.,

..:.se: a-: t:-.e cepri·;ation
It •·ou!:!
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influence on the writer of the majority opinion, in that he
accepts counsel's unsupported allegations on the one hand but
rejects findings, based upon uncontroverted representations,
by the trial court on the other.

In any event, review of

facts whether real or imaginary, was apparently very critical
in the decision of this case and we think it important that
all the judges who participated in the decision should have
had opportunity to hear argument in relation thereto.
Apparently, Petitioner felt likewise in requesting oral
argument.

It seems improper to us that the deciding vote

~n

any equity case with such deep emotional and sociological
significance should be decided by a justice who was neither
a member of the bench at the time of, nor a participant in,
the oral argument.
In the early, early case of

People v. Tid·.·:ell, 5 Ute:

88, 12 P. 638 (1887), a decision of this court \,•as challenged
on the basis that a justice who sat in the hearing of the
case and participated in the decision, was not a legal member
of the court at the time of the hearing.

This, again, is not

our precise situation, and in any event, the court held it
would not examine into the matter of the justice's standing
on a motion for rehearing.

But the court's

question is very interesting.

ion of th··

The court rcccv;nizcd th.1t the

justice's standing would have been
timely

discus,~

il

legitin,:ttc qtt• sti(•:1 if

raised, but concluded that thL·

CJllf'o;t

ic•n \·.' ". n·.tll;

no consequence becausc the justic·· involvc·J eli

l nC>~

<~•;:·,·c
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with the majority, but
the result.

dissente~

so his vote did not effect

We emphasize that in the instant case, the

justice whose authority is questioned, voted on the majority
side, and his vote was to the contrary, of dire consequence.
l'ie submit that one of two courses should now be
follmved:
1.
the basis

The decision of the court should be reversed on

th~t

a successor justice voting for Petitioner in

the majority decision was not a member of the court or a
participant in the case at the time of the oral argument.
2.

A rehearing should be grctntcd and or;ll ,trqumf!nt

permitted before the court as presently constituted.
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POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSIO~
AS TO ALLEGATIONS AND CONDITIONS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A TER!1INATION DECREE.
Improper conclusion by the court either as to law
or fact justifies a rehearing of the case.
4 U. 237, 9 P.

In re HcKnight,

299 (1886)

The majority opinion concludes that an

all~gation

that a natural mother is unable to provide for the financial
support or needs of her child is insufficient to invoke the
jurisdiction of the court in an involuntary termination
proceeding.

This conclusion is apparently based upon the

Court's construction of Section 55-10-109(1) (a), which reads:
(1) The court may decree a termination of all parental rights with respect to
one or both parents if the court finds:
(a)
That the parents are unfit or incompetent by reason of conduct or condition
seriously detrimental to the child;.
Juvenile Court proceedings are civil in nature.
(Section 55-10-105 U.C.A. 1953).

In a juvenile court pro-

ceeding the precise language of the statute need not be
stated or used in the pleading if the qualifying circumstances are alleged.
construed.

The pleadings should be liberally

The petitioner did not usc the words "unfit" or

''incompetent" in the petition.

But it did allc,Jc a condition

seriously detrimental to the child, which if proven would
obviously render the mother unfit or incOfl'[>C,tc:nt to care
for the child; to-wit, inability of the mother to

pl~oviclc:'
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bed or board for her child.

It is difficult to conceive of

a situation more detrimental to the welfare of the child.
We submit the court was wrong in concluding that such
allegation was insufficient to invoke the jursidiction of
the court under the wording of Section 55-10-109(1) (a).
The court also concludes that even if proveq, inability to support will not justify a termination decree.
"Impecuniosity will not support a termination decree."

We

believe this conclusion is likewise in error.
In a series of cases this court has recognized
that the condition of the parent, regardless of the fault
or conduct of the parent, may be seriously detrimental to
the child and justify termination of parental rights by
a juvenile court.
In the case of In re State in the Interest of
Jennings., 20 U 2d 50,

432 P.2d 879 (1967) the juvenile

court terminated a natural mother's parental rights to twin
boys born out of wedlock upon finding that the mother was
"emotionally unstable."

Specifically citing Section 55-10-

109(1) (a) this court affirmed the action of the juvenile
court.

In its opinion this court specifically referred to

the fact that the mother had contributed only a minimal
amount to the support of the children, and further that the
children were illegitimate and sired by an unknown father,
apparently being influenced by these considerations.

In the

case of In re StatP in the Interest of Mullin, 29 Ut 2d 376,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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510 P.2d 720 (1973), this court, although obviously persuaded by a heinous act of the natural father, likewise
affirmed termination of parental rights on the basis of the
In the case State,

"emotional instability" of the parent.
in the Interest of

T.G~,

532 P.2d 997 (1975) this court

affirmed a termination of parental rights by a juvenile court
on finding that the natural mother had inadequate parental
supervisory skills, was a poor housekeeper and of low moral
standards.

In the recent case of State of Utah, in the

interest of Ricky Winger, 558

P.2d 1311.

(Dec. 17, 1976-

No. 14368) this court reversed a juvenile court termination
order based upon findings of emotional stability, but not
upon the grounds that such condition might not justify deprivation of parental rights under Section 55-10-109 (l) (a),
but upon the grounds that there had not been a sufficient
showing in

that case that such condition was immediately

detrimental or harmful to the child.

In the case of State,

in the Interest of Summers Children, 560 P.2d 331,

(l-31-77),

the most recent termination appeal of which we are aware,
this court affirmed the juvenile court on the basis that
there had been an "abandonment" by the natural father under
Section 55-10-109 (1) (b), and did not revie\<J the issue of
"unfitness" under Section 55-10-109 (l) (a).

The court did,

however, sustain the abandonment on finding, amonq other things,
that the father had not provided financial support for his
children.

If failure to provide financial

support v:ill

support a finding of abandoment under Section 5')-10-lO'l ( 1)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(b),

we feel it should with equal validity support a finding of
unfitness under Section 55-10-109 (l) (a).

We urge therefore

that an allegation that a mother is unable to provide financial
support or care for the needs of her child is sufficient to
invoke the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Section

55-10-109(1) (a), and that a finding of such condition of the
mother is sufficient to support a termination decree based
upon unfitness or

inco~tency

under said Section.

Apparently the court also feels that the evidence
doesn't support a finding of inability to support.

This being

the case, we feel the appropriate course in a matter of such
moment would be to remand the case for further hearing in the
trial court as to that issue.
For this court to only revoke the termination decree
with nothing more, may recreate a situation where the child
is simply restored to foster care, a situation which may
last indefinately or at least so long as the mother is unable
to care for the child.

The child may never have a permanent

home and may be destined to perpetual public support.

This

latter circumstance is contrary to the expressed direction
of the Legislature.

(Section 78-45-4 U.C.A 1953 as amended-

dut'/ of womon to support her child).

And the former circum-

stance of maintaining the child without permanent parental
tics is abhorant to public policy.

As stated by Justice

Crockett in In n' adoption of ~ , 122 U. 525, 252 P.2d
223 (1951):
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Public Policy favors the adoption
of children who are left without parental
refuge.
Once a child has been cast adrift
and is without responsible parental care,
the policy of the law should be to assist
in every way in establishing a satisfactory
parent-child and family relationship.
Adoptive parents should not be discouraged
by a construction of the law which would
cause them to fear the consequences of
accepting a child because of the knowledge
that the fate of their efforts would be at
the will of the natural parent. (252 P.2d 229)
POINT III
THE COURT IN VACATING THE ORDER OF
TERMIHATIOH 1 FAILED TO CO!lSIDER THE LEGAL
EFFECT OF INTERVENING ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS
OR TO GIVE LEGAL DEFEREtlCE TO THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD.
Failure of the appeal court to consider material
points in the case is grounds for rehearing.

(In re :-lcKnight,

supra).
On a close reading of the court's opinion we find
no consideration given regarding the legal effect of intervening adoption proceedings or any mention made as to the best
interests of the child, both of which points were raised by
respondent on appeal.
\•le complain

(Brief of Respondent

Points I and VI).

of this exclusion not from vJounded vanity, but

because both points are by previous case decision material
to the issue of permanent deprivation of parental rights.

As

we understand, the majority opinion bases its decision on the
matters of sufficiency of pleadings, invocation of jurisdiction,
and compliance with statute.
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In the case of Harrison v. Harker, 44 Utah 541, 142
P. 716

(1914), the natural mother in a habeas corpus proceeding

sought to recover custody of an infant child whom she had delivered through a third party to defendants for purposes of
adoption shortly

after its birth.

In a lengthy and monumental

opinion, the court discussed, among other things, the matter of
"legal rights" in a custody contest.

The court said:

(142 Pac.

719):
This court is now firmly co~~itted
to the doctrine that in such proceedings
we will be controlled by what appears to
be the best interests and welfare of the
child, rather than by the naked legal
right of those claiming it.
We gather frorn this language that in custody cases
there are matters of grave irnport which should be considered
by the appellate court, matters which perhaps transcend
technicalities of the law and "naked legal rights."

Justice

Crockett in In Pe Adoption of D__ , supra, suggests that each
of these type of cases depends upon its own facts, and enunerates several important things that should be considered, ineluding the length of time the adopting parents have had the
child; any "vested rights" that have intervened; the welfare
of the child, and the conduct, as well as the character and
ability of the respective claimants.
sec~ed

All of these things

to have been lost in the instant case in the shadow

of a contron:rted issue as to whether or not Petitioner had
been advised of her right to counsel.
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One wonders in all this legal haggle over

~hether

this is a case of voluntary or involuntary ternination,
whether inability to provide constitutes "unfitness,'' whether
the Juvenile Court had jurisdiction or not, whether Petitioner
had waived or had not waived her right to counsel, ar.c whether
or not Petitioner had or had not, at the final hearir.g, been
advised of her right to counsel--one wonders through all this
as to who is speaking for the child.
the child?

~fuat

are the rights of

Since we are only deciding relationships for the

rest of her life, what does the child have to say abcut it?
Where is her guardian ad litem?

In the first place, her

mother voluntarily gave her over to the Division of Far.1ily
Services because she could not take care of her.
had nothing to say about that.

The child
~other

Fifteen months later,

petitioner asks for her back, and now after three
other horne, the only horee she has ever

kno~n,

ye~rs

in an-

this court says

back you go--and her interests are apparently not tc be cor.sidered.

The juvenile judge tried to speak for her,

~herein

he said:
\fuere there is a conflict l::t'tl·ee:-~
the interests--and even the rights--of
parents and those of their children this
court is obliged to give pre-e8inence to
the children's interests and ri~hts.
~o
take this child from her adootive o~rents
who have been found bv the olstrici Cc~rt
to be fit and qualifi~d, and return ~e~
to an unrc.rried nother 1:::o co:-.cc:. \'CC: !'.2:·
and bore her out of ~edlock by a ~~n 5~(
cannot e¥e~ ~a~e vould L,e a gr2\"C i~~~s~ic·
to the chi:!.d, to the lo•:inc; aco:·ti·.·c ,.:::·c~.~s
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and probably even to the natural mother,
who might then yet again be found incompetent to care for the child and go
through the process all over again.
Certainly the !'\other \o/as afforded
more formality and far more protection of
her rights by the judicial proceedings held
in the instant case than would have been
the case had she just signed over the child
in the usual manner to Division of Family
Services or other placement agency.
(MeDoranduD Decision, Case No. 252370, District Juvenile Court for Heber County, May
11, 1976)
Our child's cause \·;as perhaps r.-.ore adequately
statea in the case of In Re Adoption of Richardson, 59 Cal.
Rptr.

323

cepted the
of

t~e

(1967), wherein the California Court of Appeals actesti~ony

of Dr. Arthur H. Parmelee, Jr., Director

Pediatrics Clinic at the University of California at

Los Angeles as to the impact over a nine month old child on
separation from the only parents it had known:
Disruption of the continuity of care
of this baby at his present age is critical
and could be permanently damaging to him.
It is \:ell kno;-m that babies nanifest their
greatest anxiety over separation from their
parents in the age period of eight months
to t•·:o years.
This little boy is nou being
separated fro~ the only parents he knows.
He will go into a ter:1porary foster hor.1e
where he will try to make new attachments.
r;hen h~ will be placfed in a neu home and
the eJ'T\otional separation from his foster
ho~e will take place.
This sequence of
events in that age period can be devastating
to the develop~ent of healthy emotional attachments to people for the remainder of
this child's life.
(Emphasis in original)
In a letter to the editor appearing in the Salt
Lake

~rit~ne

on

~arch

4, 1977, Dr. Delbert T. Goates, M. D.,
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Child Psychiatrist, on reading of the instant case, wrote:
The Utah Supreme Court has legally
abused another child.
. romantic decisions, such as this, in favor of the
'natural' mother are devoid of justice
for the child.
If the young mother
were standing alone two years ago, at 16
years of age, consider the plight of the
three-year-old subjected to the recent
abuse of the Utah Supreme Court.
Even if
the juvenile court had erred, removing the
child, a second wrong, will not make a
right. Compassionate parents of threeyear-olds everywhere readily recognize,
as did Judges Ellett and Crockett, 'that
the court was not considering the welfare
of the child' in transplanting her so
cavalierly at three years of age.
In the Harrison v. Harker case, supra, Justice
Frick states the matter as a legal proposition by quoting
from the earlier case of Hummel v. Parrish,

13~

Pac. 898

(1913), as follows thus:
The legal presumption is that it
is for the best interests of the child
and of society for the child to remain
with its natural parents during the period of its minority, and be maintained,
cared for, and educated by them and under
their supervision and direction.
But tl1is
is not an absolute right of the parent.
The decisions rendered in this class of
cases almost universally hold that where,
as here, a parent has surrendered the control of his child when it was a toddling
infant to other parties, and permitted
them to maintain, clothe, feed, and care
for it . . . and a strong reciprocal mutual affection has grown up between the
child and its foster parents,
. and
the parent seeks to recover possession
of the child, the natural or presumptiv~
right of the parent cannot prevail, if
the interests and welfare of the child
forbid it.
The law in such cases regard~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
-18-

the welfare and permanent interest of the
child much more ir.1portant than the natural
or presUQptive right of the parent.
In
other words, the paramount consiceration
in such cases is the well-being of the
child.
If it appears to the court that
the physical, intellectual, social, moral,
and educational training and general welfare and happiness of the child will be
best promoted by leaving it with the foster parents, the presumptive right of the
natural parent must yield to the interests
of the child.
(142 Pac. 719)
The court states in our instant case that the Juvenile Court did not comply with the provisions of Section 55-10-109;
it thus exceeded its jurisdiction, and the termination order
was void, subject to direct attack in a proceeding to vacate.
So be it.
not te

But in the interests of the child,

so~e

s~~~ld

court recognized statute of limitations.

their
Is

said decree to be subject to attack at 15 r.1onths, three-years,
five-years, ten-years?
Over and over the court has said that the interests
of the child are parar.1ount in custody cases.

He think it was

error for the court to seer.1ingly ignore this rule in the instant case and that said error is grounds for rehearing.
cm:CLUSiotl
The day the court's decision was issued, I looked
at

~y

te~dy

little three-year old girl lying asleep on her bed,
bear tucked under one arm and blonde locks loosely

scattered on the pillow slip, and said to myself, "My God,
what if I were the adoptive parent of Baby Girl Marie?"
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Respondent, child placement agencies, social
service workers, psychologists, needful children, aooptive
applicants, adoptive parents and all parents who have threeyear old children view with alarm the impact of the court's
decision.

As lawyers, we should, of course, be equally con-

cerned about the rights and feelings of the natural rother,
and we would be if we could feel her rights have,in fact,
been ignored and that she had made diligent and timely efforts to recover custody of the child.

But the court has

reviewed these procedural matters, discussed theM in its
opinion and we do not ask a rereview of same as justification
for a rehearing of the appeal.
We do earnestly feel, however, that a rehearing is
arg~ed

justified and should be granted on the basis, as

under

Point I, that Justice Hall, who cast a decisive vote in the

cas~,

was neither a member of the court nor did he partici::>a.te in
the oral argllr.'.ent of the case.
is critical in the instant case.

1\e believe this circ::-'star.ce
Furthe~

on the basis that the court erred in its

we crge

re~earing

co~clusic~s

as to

the sufficiency of the allegations mace by the reti tic:--._r ir.
its initial Petition and as to the jurisdiction c~ t~e Juvenile Court based thereon, as argueC. in Point I~

ar.~

~n t~e

basis that the court £aile~ to consiC.er t~c le~a! c~~cct of
intervening adoption proceedings or to give ccr.sij~~~~icr.
to the best interests of t:-:.2 c:1ilC::, as a:-~--=~-~ ·~ ?c~:--~

'---·
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l-Ie respectful:!.;: and sincerely request a reconsideration and reversal o: tr.e rr,ajori ty opinion for these
reasons.
Respectfully

sub~itted,

ROBERT B. HANSE:;
At~orney

General

~~---Li;-- J3 /1'~ a-r---F~~~LYN

B.

~~TEESO~

Assista&t Attorney General
Attorneys for

Respo~dent
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